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Executive summary
Executive Summary: The emerging consensus on the need to
establish more effective United Nations mechanisms for managing
the transition from conflict to peace, and on the importance of
addressing the nexus between development and security, is not
sufficiently reflected in the organisational structure or logic of UN
operations. This report argues that tailored policy responses should
be introduced or strengthened at the institutional, intergovernmental
and regional levels, to deal effectively with the challenges of
peacekeeping, peace-building and transition management. The
debate about the need for more improved transition management
and better coordination mirrors the larger debate about the role of
the organisation and UN system integration.
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Transition Management
1. Introduction
Managing transitions from conflict to peace has become the primary
responsibility of the United Nations in the 21st century. Though the
world organisation has recorded several successes in this field in
recent years, it has also come under international scrutiny for failing
to achieve tangible or lasting results in rectifying conflict situations.
The implications have been disastrous for the millions around the
world ravaged by war. If the UN is to improve its record and adapt
its institutional structure to respond more effectively to these crises,
it will have to reconsider the way it addresses the synergy between
development and security in conflict areas. Conceptually the UN
has come a long way, but operationally it still lags behind. This is
due in part to uncertainties related to the heavily political dimension
of peace-building activities, and in part to the gap between political
realities and strategic, tactical and operational abilities. A key issue
is the organisational relationship and policy coordination between
the field of development and the field of security.
Today, more than any other time in the UN history, the UN di-
plomatic community has recognised the need to address the ‘root
causes of conflict’ and thereby anticipate eruptions of violence.
However, meaningful progress has been slow. What is needed is a
«A Stradivarius violin is nothing more than an assemblage of
wood and catgut. It takes a musician to get the harmony out of
it. But if the player is at fault, there is no sense in blaming it on
the instrument – still less in smashing its principle.» (Sir Ale-
xander Cadogan, United Nations Security Council, 1946)
1 This paper is based on a study by NUPI, commissioned by the Ministries of
Foreign Affairs of Norway and of Sweden. Anja Kaspersen has been the main
researcher and author of this document, under a NUPI project directed by Espen
Barth Eide. The author is grateful to Espen Barth Eide, Torunn L. Tryggestad,
Ståle Ulriksen, Ole Jacob Sending, Kjersti Brathagen and Nicolas Ruble for their
valuable comments and support.
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more sustained focus on preventing conflicts by investing in long-
term development policies, or «structural prevention».
The UN is currently covering only part of the job by focusing on
law-enforcement functions in post-conflict areas. New problems
of governance require new and more sophisticated policy respon-
ses. Merging policy tools from the security sector and the develop-
ment sector can help render responses more effective. Otherwise,
it is the situation in the field at the end of hostilities, at the end of the
mediation process or the peace-enforcement campaign, which fun-
damentally determines the conditions for long-term stability and
political development. Any cease-fire or peace agreement will struc-
ture the post-conflict political system. Conflict management should
therefore be coupled with long-term peace-building activities as a
whole, rather than as two separate processes. A key objective of
any process of transition from war to peace is to establish channels
and rules of the game through which political disagreements can
be settled without resorting to violence.
2. Transition to What?
For the UN, transition denotes «the period in a crisis when external
assistance is most crucial in supporting or underpinning still fragile
cease-fires or peace processes by helping to create the conditions
for political stability, security, justice and social equity».2 The
overarching goal of any transition is to consolidate peace through
reform measures aimed at recasting government institutions in the
image of a coherent and robust state order. Recent experiences in
Haiti, Liberia and Kosovo indicate that current approaches are
flawed. There are no quick fixes: a change in responses will require
a well-planned, holistic approach.
Peace building3 is a critical supplement to preventive efforts,
peacemaking and peacekeeping. Because these three instruments
are complementary but synchronous, the transition from one to the
other may be uncertain. Where does one transition phase end and
the next begin? This in turn complicates the projection of a peace-
keeping exit strategy.
From the outset it is essential that parties clearly spell out the
«endgame» parameters, meaning the set of conditions that must be
2 Report of the UNDG/ECHA Working Group on Transition Issues, Para 13.
3 According to the UN Secretary General, peace building consists of a series of
«actions undertaken at the end of a conflict to consolidate peace and prevent a
recurrence of armed confrontation».
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matched by realities on the ground for a transition to be deemed
successful. They further need to assign specific responsibilities and
tasks to legitimate authorities, since determining the division of la-
bour will ultimately dictate the appropriate means and mechanisms
to employ. The object of the peace-building phase is more a ques-
tion of transition than of reconstruction. Hence, while protagonists
of the «security-development» nexus recognise security as a pre-
condition for development, they also take a positive «development»
approach to change. In contrast, traditional security thinking tends
to be geared towards maintaining the status quo.
What is still lacking within both the UN and in the wider inter-
national community is an agreed recognition of the specific direction
of change that we, the international community, want to encourage.
While most would agree that «peace» and some kind of economic
progress are desired outcomes, the diplomatic community has re-
mained vague on the specific nature of the state and society struc-
tures it seeks to nurture over the long term.
2.1 Universalism versus pluralism
If the UN is to progress toward advancing institutional reform, it
will need to look introspectively and to find its role within a larger
international context marked by a shift from pluralism to universalism.
While originally geared towards managing intergovernmental rela-
tions between states with highly differing political systems, the tens-
ion between a pluralist vision and a more universalistic principle of
minimum conditions of statehood was introduced already in the
1948 Declaration on Human Rights. However, in peace and security
terms the UN remained overwhelmingly pluralist throughout the
Cold War. This was a matter of necessity: the superpower conflict,
with strong powers with veto rights representing both sides of the
East–West divide, made sure that the UN did not take sides, for
instance as to the desirability of a market-based or a state-controlled
economy, or between competitive democracy versus one-party rule.
To what extent may an international community that includes a
large number of authoritarian states claim that the only serious source
of legitimacy is democracy? To be sure, efforts to develop good
governance, the rule of law, gender equality and security-sector
institutions respecting human rights and similar concepts linked to
so-called universal values have been introduced as part of state
building. But they have been introduced in piecemeal and technical
ways rather than as part of a coherent strategy to reach a clearly
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defined goal. An in-depth discussion of the complexities and impli-
cations of transporting certain universalistic values based on plura-
list ideas is both timely and necessary.
If the international community cannot agree on the desired out-
come of change for a particular country, the final outcome will not
be a result of one grand plan but will depend on the interplay bet-
ween various strategies and policies seeking to achieve limited goals,
and the ability to implement them. Today, interventions labelled as
state-building exercises are conceived of in terms of incremental
«phases». A conflict phase is separated from a varying number of
post-conflict phases. Even documents calling for more holistic ap-
proaches to state building tend to ignore the combat phase, includi-
ng the violence wielded by the intervening party. Some calls for a
holistic approach to post-conflict activities notwithstanding, there has
as yet been scant conceptual progress and even less progress in
implementing such an approach on the ground.
An increasing willingness to describe «minimum conditions of
statehood» and to qualify state sovereignty with state legitimacy
would greatly facilitate internationally assisted processes of transi-
tions. Following through on these would help to answer the funda-
mental question: transition to what? Local ownership and traditional
customs must be taken into account. We fundamentally believe that
these principles, if carefully balanced, can be reconciled with a more
«universalistic» understanding of the role of the state in a world
which still cherishes diversity, but which is no longer divided into
two distinct political camps.
2.2  Mission impossible? Transforming rhetoric into reality
With such widespread consensus on the need and aims for creating
sustainable peace, one could be forgiven for thinking that the
prospects for peace building worldwide were promising. But why
and how then, after civil wars end, do grievances become re-inflamed
and conflict situations ultimately rekindled? Varying experiences in
post-conflict peace building so far raise more questions than they
provide answers. Still, one certainty stands out: the absence of
stability, security, the rule of law, respect for human rights and
resources spent on development will rarely translate into lasting
peace. Stability, in turn, is possible only as long as those affected by
war are given hope for the future and experience improvements in
their daily lives. This is doubly true if an intervention raises the
expectations of the affected population. Failure to meet, at least in
Transition Management
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part, those expectations may provoke hostility and resentment toward
the intervening authority. The reintegration of former combatants,
for instance, has seldom worked well in the past. Ensuring a more
coherent bond between security and development activities – such
as generating jobs – could go a long way toward enhancing the
effectiveness of reintegration, thus lessening the risk of a return to
violence.
The international community has agreed that the complexity of
this issue requires coherent strategies, more coordination and ef-
fective and concerted action. Yet, the same advocates of peace
generally remain absent when it comes to putting their chips on the
table and committing meaningful political and financial capital.
Neither is there agreement as to who should determine the bench-
marks of success. While the rhetoric may be interventionist, peace-
building efforts have been somewhat ad hoc, and few seem
concerned about the quality of the peace that they want to build.
A recent report by the UNDG/ECHA Working Group on Tran-
sition Issues stressed that local host governments, however weak
and inexperienced, must play an active role in all development acti-
vities of the post-conflict phase. But in an extreme post-conflict
situation, local communities are unlikely to be able to lead or assume
ownership of the transition process. The UN must be prepared to
fill this leadership vacuum, maintaining responsibility and even
assuming control for transition/peace-building activities. Some donors
are reluctant to provide aid or funding without commitment from
the local host government. This means that the commitment to
working with extreme cases may wane quickly, with a greater like-
lihood of a relapse into conflict. The international community need
to develop more creative, innovative and well attuned responses with
regard to strengthening local capacities.
It is sometimes difficult to sustain a more continued engagement,
as it may be perceived as an infringement by the UN on the sove-
reignty of a given country. What constitutes a «major» emergency
may be dictated by political or strategic interests and – for better or
worse – by the media. When the risk of violent conflict has passed
and the situation has entered a post-conflict phase, it usually means
a reduction in international attention. Lessons learned have shown
that this normally implies less funding to rebuild the country and
consequently increased risk of backsliding into conflict. Evidence
suggests that focusing on ways to increase growth and create
awareness of the importance of signalling the government’s inten-
tions in a post-conflict setting are the best ways of preventing backs-
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liding into conflict.4 Moreover, further attention needs to be paid to
cutting off financing for rebel groups. Particular focus should also
be given to the role of diasporas in prolonging conflict, on the one
hand, and to aid policies and programme objectives, on the other.
Fostering long-term social and economic growth is the best means
to prevent the recurrence of civil war.
2.3 Building sustainable peace
A major flaw with the UN system is that it becomes too concerned
with supplying solutions rather than constructively addressing the
problem. It is important that the specific goals of a transition process
are identified, from the outset, yet remain flexible.
Three main concerns arise: First, the division of labour between
peacekeeping and peace-building operations. The grey area bet-
ween peacekeeping and peace-building makes it difficult to draw a
clear distinction, and it would not be very fruitful to do so. It is im-
portant to include both peace-building objectives and transition stra-
tegies from the start of the mission, preferably in the mandate and
in the exit strategy as well, to ensure continuity and backstopping
of longer-term peace-building tasks. In existing missions where post-
conflict peace-building elements have not been incorporated at the
outset of a mandate, recommendations concerning the transitional
period should be included in the final phasing-out of the operation.
The military actions taken to create peace or take over control of
the country in question will have lasting influence long after the last
shot is fired. It is, in this sense, vital to design the military campaign
plan to support the long-term goal. Today, those campaigns are
normally more influenced by the nature of the coalitions and armed
forces carrying them out, than by coherent plans for long-term po-
litical development. The strategies, doctrines and organisation of the
armed forces and the strategic cultures of the international institu-
tions and alliances, as well as of their member states, are vital pre-
conditions for action. They heavily affect the outcome of the conflict
phase, and thus the starting point for the post-conflict phases.
Second, it should be acknowledged that investing in peace building
means investing for the future and prosperity of a country, and if
done properly such an investment can prevent a reoccurrence of
4 Collier, Paul (et al.): Breaking the Conflict Trap. Civil War and Development
Policy, a World Bank Policy Research Report, co-publication of the World
Bank and Oxford University Press, 2003.
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conflict. The clear engagement of the host country is crucial in
achieving these objectives; without it, outside assistance will ulti-
mately fail. The UN itself will never have adequate resources to
do the enormous job that serious peace building entails. But it can
and should serve as a facilitator and coordinator of the wider UN
system and the international community.
Third, coordinating peacekeeping and peace building activities
requires strong leadership authorised to make decisions, and a clear
division of labour. To ensure a credible process, conditions for full
cooperation must be established and the level of authority given to
decisions made by the variety of already established coordination
mechanisms must be agreed upon. It is important to clarify who
should «own» the processes and initiatives. Projects and program-
mes need to be designed and management processes structured to
encourage national commitment, including civil society and local
NGOs. National ownership must be sustained for long-term pro-
grammes in the face of high staff turnover, policy shifts and econ-
omic disruptions. Helping to manage relationships, working to
increase trust, communication and mutual accountability and colla-
boration – these are key tasks of the UN system.
Reconstruction and economic development projects are often
launched in isolation from DD&R processes.5 It is an obvious fact
that demobilisation in a society where economic activity has stalled
almost completely will cause massive unemployment. It is also obvi-
ous that the creation of a large castaway group of idle young men
and women trained for combat and then stripped of their one source
of income can scarcely promote stability. Nevertheless, large-scale
reconstruction projects have been launched in both Iraq and Afghan-
istan to rebuild roads or industrial complexes as fast as possible, often
with imported labour, without a single thought for the idle ex-com-
batant workforce. On the other hand, in instances where DD&R is
said to work, it may create the impression that former combatants
are being rewarded for their past. While people who have commit-
ted themselves to the peaceful upholding of society during crisis may
not benefit from aid, former warriors who have often lived by plun-
der may receive financial support as a group and, individually, a neat
sum of money if they hand in their weapons. Such signals may give
the impression that violence is rewarded.
An important issue rarely discussed is the need to acknowledge
the role of culture in peacekeeping. Attention should be given to
5 Disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration of former combatants.
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international and national attitudes, the formation of a common miss-
ion identity with a common purpose. A further challenge is mana-
ging issues of interoperability and organisational cultural differences
– particularly in light of the increase in hybrid and integrated mis-
sions – among mission components, non governmental organisations,
military, civilian police and in interactions with local population, with
regard to law, politics and conflict resolution practices, gender ro-
les, economic and subsistence practices. Ultimately, the substanti-
ve legitimacy of peacekeeping is supported at the international and
national levels by practice, symbols and rituals. This is evident in
the conventionalised actions through which peacekeeping missions
are created (i.e. Security Council consultations and resolutions aut-
horising tasks assigned to peacekeeping troops ceremonies). In
hybrid or integrated operations there are fewer opportunities for
synchronising a common frame of reference. Relations with local
populations are affected by the expectations of these populations
about peace operations, so it is critical to have a well-planned com-
mon public information strategy from the outset of the mission. Since
conflict alters traditional cultural patterns, restoring a society requi-
res an understanding of these as a baseline. This must be reflected
both in mission planning and in the training given to all personnel
prior to deployment, as well as providing an opportunity to act with
future counterparts in the field in joint mission exercises or simula-
tions, including local counterparts.
3. Intergovernmental, Regional and Institutional
Processes
3.1  Intergovernmental processes
Numerous reports and resolutions adopted by UN Member States
have stressed the importance of rapid and well-coordinated
responses backstopped with resources to ensure a smooth transit-
ion to peace. Can this need for an improved link between rapid
reaction and sustained resources be met when the international
community seems to thrive on duplication and redundancy, and
political will and commitment remain largely rhetorical?
3.1.1 Funding
According to the UNDG/ECHA report, the keys to effective tran-
sition are adequate, flexible, sustained funding and early donor enga-
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gement in critical sectors and support for national capacity building,
including governance.
Issues of quality and accountability have generated a debate on
the role of the UN, international financial institutions, various regi-
onal organisations and bilateral aid. At a high-level OECD meeting
held in Paris in April 2004, the need to reconsider the international
developmental architecture was stressed, but not met. It was agreed
that development and security are inextricably linked, and that this
synergy should be reflected across all relevant parts of government.
The debate about allowing donor countries to use ODA-approved
funding to support peacekeeping activities is complex and long over-
due. The normative reasons given for not financing peacekeeping
operations with development money may be valid, but this also rai-
ses questions about the normative reasons for not supporting such
actions when these are aimed directly at promoting human security
through reducing and solving violent conflicts. There is also gene-
ral consensus on the need to strengthen the harmonisation between
multilateral and bilateral initiatives, yet, harmonisation in the field
remains elusive, due in part to the difficulties that the multilaterals
face with donor earmarking. National demands for so-called «visi-
ble aid» might in fact lead to more harm than good. There is a need
to assess how donors can work more effectively to ensure that
bilateral efforts are well coordinated with, and complement, pro-
jects initiated through the UN system and regional organisations, to
avoid fragmented efforts. Competing demands and rigid donor re-
gulations have made cooperation on critical areas difficult.
3.1.2 The feasibility of a subsidiary UN Security Council
«clearinghouse»
In his Millennium Implementation Report, the UN Secretary-Gene-
ral proposed the establishment of a Security Council subsidiary body
responsible for issues relating to transition management and post-
conflict peace building.
The Security Council’s Working Group on Peacekeeping Ope-
rations was established according to the Presidential Statement in
January 2001 (S/PRST/2001/3). The Working Group met regularly
throughout 2001, and although few actual results were produced,
important topics were discussed. Since then, it has not met on a
regular basis and has in many ways been marginalised. A recent
Presidential Statement (S/PRST/2004/16) reiterates the importance
of the working group and looks at ways to strengthen and expand
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its work agenda. One option would be to transform the working group
(including the ad hoc working group on conflict prevention) into a
subsidiary organ with the elements required to ensure a smooth tran-
sition to the process of peace. This could prove useful in the work
of the Security Council, especially when the Council itself is con-
cerned with new, more acute crises. Such a «revised» working
group would advise the Council on matters related to post-conflict
transition as well as peacekeeping and the process leading up to
sustainable peace building. The group would take the form of a
«clearing-house» mechanism where information on relapse into
conflict, elements to shore up new-found peace etc, would com-
plement that of early warning signs and information on available
personnel and equipment. The structure ought to include represen-
tatives from the political/diplomatic plenary, the operational actors
and a bureau of support and expert staff. Planning efforts could draw
on resources directly linked to peacekeeping, as well as experien-
ce from transitional phases where peacekeeping operations are
coming to an end. This would require good and transparent rela-
tions with other related mechanisms, like the Special Committee on
Peacekeeping Operations and other relevant executing funds, pro-
grammes and agencies on the ground.
To function as a «clearing-house mechanism», the organ should
receive relevant reports and analyses from UN funds, programmes,
agencies etc., to have available all internal reports on issues rela-
ting to post-conflict transitions to durable peace. This, together with
information from the field and regional partners, should enable the
«clearing house» to report to the Security Council on situations where
societies are close to relapsing into violent conflict, or where early
warning signs of an imminent crisis have been noted. It would also
enable the «clearing house» to report on what resources are avai-
lable within the UN system or from regional partners. With its in-
formation base, such an entity could enhance the planning capabilities
and coordination of operations as well.
3.1.3 ECOSOC
Any reform of multilateral institutions, including the international
financial institutions and the Economic and Social Council of the
UN (ECOSOC), must reflect current political realities in terms of
representation, voting, participation and coordination. The need to
start from scratch and establish an altogether new economic body
has been widely debated in recent years. If such a body were to be
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established, all stakeholders should be brought on board to ensure
accountability for its functions. Today’s ECOSOC is seen as
unfocused, too large and unwieldy for real decision-making. The
need for reform is acknowledged, but remains highly contentious.
A fundamental problem of the global multilateral system on the
economic side is that it is so dispersed: there is ECOSOC and the
UNDP (and the UN Development Group) within the UN, and the
World Bank (WB), the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the
World Trade Organisation (WTO) outside the UN «proper». Co-
herent action in economic development often requires the holistic
application of macro-economic measures, development aid and trade
policies. However, there exists no forum that can address all of these
effectively. After several reform attempts, it remains uncertain
whether ECOSOC is capable of fulfilling this overarching role. At
best, it could serve as the focal point for ensuring such broad-bas-
ed policies; at worst, it could degenerate into a black hole into which
considerable energy is channelled but where no decisions of real
importance come out.
To date, reforms have yielded limited results. Some have gone
as far as to suggest that ECOSOC should be abolished altogether
and replaced with new mechanisms to ensure genuine policy coor-
dination between operational actors both within and outside the UN
as such. This report argues that even if such a fundamental rethink
of the international economic organisation were to become the fa-
voured solution, it is unlikely that it would gain sufficient political
support. Not least because of resistance from the Non-Aligned
Movement (NAM). With over 70 per cent of the UN’s workload
being of a social or economic character, there is clearly a need for
an effective body to deal with these concerns. It would be opportu-
ne to identify ways of strengthening and alter the current system
by tasking ECOSOC with the monitoring of emerging conflicts, or
conflicts with a potential to reoccur; overseeing humanitarian acti-
vities; reinforcing the mandate of the Chief Executive Board to
coordinate such activities; managing UN efforts in post-conflict
situations together with the Security Council; and initiating a deba-
te on the universality of democracy, the division of labour and the
role of ECOSOC versus UN funds and programmes.
In addition to the thematic approach currently adopted by ECO-
SOC, adopting the Arria Formula could prove useful in improving
contact with the civil society and academia.6
6 The Arria Formula is an informal arrangement that allows the Security Council
greater flexibility to be briefed about international peace and security issues.
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3.2  Regional processes
The increasing number of peacekeeping operations, and the deficit
in troops and police contributions, have forced the international
community to rethink the role regional organisations can and ought
to play in accordance with the UN Charter. Creating a sense of
ownership for long-term solutions to regional problems is crucial,
and regional initiatives enjoy obvious advantages. Such initiatives
should be stimulated to prevent countries emerging from war from
backsliding into conflict, and to promote democratic development
while supporting the transition to peace.
The specific role of regional organisations in policing will natu-
rally vary from organisation to organisation and from region to re-
gion.
Creating a sense of regional ownership for long-term solutions
to regional problems is crucial. The United Nations and donor co-
untries should ensure that efforts, including bilateral donor-funded
projects, are implemented in such a way that they are not counter-
productive to the long-term objectives of the region.
It is necessary to approach Africa’s peace and security chal-
lenges from an African perspective to identify how the range of
different actors can play their roles within a broad framework –
with assistance attuned to the immediate realities and challenges
of the continent.
The UN and specific regional institutions like the EU, NATO
and soon the AU have devoted huge resources to creating military
rapid-response capabilities with standing command structures and
prepared plans for deployment. Except for the ongoing work to
create a European civilian crisis-handling mechanism in the EU,
there have been no comparable projects on the civilian side. Such
concepts should be discussed with other regional organisations, and
conceptually further developed. In order to facilitate rapid respon-
se – and to avoid friction between agencies every time a new miss-
ion is launched –pre-prepared and exercised civilian deployable
multifunctional units should be formed. Such units could be formed
by regional institutions, by coalitions of states, or by the UN itself
(or any combination of these through complementing each other).
Recent efforts by the UN and the EU working together to define
The Arria Formula enables a member of the Council to invite other Council
members to an informal meeting, held outside Council chambers, for the pur-
pose of briefings by one or more experts on a given topic or matter of concern
to the Council. Source: Global Policy Forum Home Page (www.globalpolicy.org).
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the practical modalities for such cooperation (including the need for
further elaboration on the implications of «re-hatting» or so-called
«bridging models» versus stand-by arrangements) are an important
step. Similar arrangements should be considered with regard to other
regional organisations. Moreover, the staff exchange programme,
between the United Nations and the AU, that was initiated in 1999
(S/1999/1008) but never implemented should be revitalised and
expanded to include other regional organisations, with the objective
of familiarising counterparts with each other’s work, facilitating
exchange of experiences and creating awareness about systemic
opportunities and constraints; this applies to civilian personnel as well.
Within the AU there has been considerable focus on the need
for regional peacekeeping brigades, and efforts are underway to
set these up. But the willingness to engage in the military aspects
of peace operations probably far surpasses the AU’s capacities to
do so. The need for regional capacities for managing transition and
peace building should be given equal if not more emphasis. A com-
mon African agenda needs to be reset on the regional level, linked
to the governance framework and long-term needs of the continent.
It should be a responsibility on the collective African level to
assist in state building within the member units. The recurrence of
conflicts in Liberia and Haiti, the tragedy of Darfur and the signing
of a peace agreement in the long-standing conflict in Sudan point
up the need to re-think the issue of transition from post-conflict to
durable peace. The most constructive role for the AU and its sub-
regions is arguably to take on particular responsibility in this area.
Moreover, the scope of external engagement needs to be exami-
ned, and bilateral engagement aimed at protecting specific national
interests should be shunned.7
Another important aspect of the successful management of fra-
gile transitions is the development of effective regional strategies
to deal with the problem of spoilers;8 conflict-fuelling economic
resources in war zones; smuggling; mercenaries; and trafficking –
to mention but a few. Efforts should be intensified to allow for joint
cross-border policing patrols.
Lastly, willingness to stay the course is critical. Although, The
7 For example: multinational corporations and nations seeking oil supplies while
turning a blind eye to criminal engagement elsewhere, or efforts like the US
bilateral Joint Task Force and «training» initiative to strengthen the African
response to terrorism.
8 Stephen J Stedman «Spoiler Problems in Peace Processes», International Security,
Vol. 22, No. 2 (1997), pp. 5–53.
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EU’s Operation Artemis was recognised as a huge success, it also
raises some critical questions for similar engagement in the future:
Did the EU leave too early? How long is long enough? Could the
Artemis capacity realistically have been sustained under MONUC,
and would that have prevented the events that later transpired?
3.3  The UN Secretariat, funds and programmes
Effective intervention starts with making the right diagnosis through
an adequate analysis capacity to prescribe the right cure. The UN
Secretariat still suffers a great deficit in this respect. Contrary to
popular belief, the problem is not lack of information, but the proper
capacity to analyse and manage this information. The need for an
information-gathering and analysis capacity has been noted in
numerous UN reports, as well as in independent studies and reviews,
and is still being debated. Also the present report stresses the
importance of establishing such a capacity. Recent tragic events
and eye-opening reports on issues like personnel security clearly
demonstrate the need for such a capacity. On the other hand, mere
analysis is not enough without the political will to convert rhetoric
into reality.
The Secretariat, funds and programmes have been ambiguous
in interpreting the relationship between humanitarian and political
action, in particular whether and how the former should be subsu-
med under a wider peace-building agenda. The debate surrounding
integration and independence is also complicated by the lack of
systematic assessment of evidence on the practical and uninten-
ded consequences of various arrangements. This report endorses
intensified efforts to undertake frequent real-time evaluations9 and
impact assessments.
3.3.1 Existing arrangements for coordination
The Secretariat, funds and programmes are still struggling to
establish an effective framework for coordination. The problem is
not due to any lack of efforts – quite the contrary. It would seem
that every time the issue of coordination is addressed, another
mechanism is created. To name but a few, the Chief Executive
9 Real-time evaluation is a diagnostic and problem-solving tool designed to provide
an alternative approach to assessing complex and rapidly changing situations
on the ground. It ensures that instant input can be fed back in time to improve
the efficiency and effectiveness of mission planning and implementation.
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Board (former Administrative Committee on Coordination) was
established by ECOSOC in 1946 with a mandate to convene the
executive heads of all organisations of the UN system, chaired by
the SG, to focus on questions of coordination and crosscutting po-
licy. In addition, the SG organised four sectored Executive
Committees (EC) in 1997, to bring together all relevant departments,
funds and programmes under the headings of the EC on Peace and
Security (chaired by the Department of Political Affairs, DPA);
the EC on Humanitarian Affairs (chaired by the Office for the
Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs); the EC on Economic and
Social Affairs (chaired by the Department of Economic Social
Affairs); and the EC – Development Group (UNDG, chaired by
the United Nations Development Programme). These committees
have not been as successful as anticipated in pursuing their man-
date. The current four-pillar structure also shows that the gap
remains between the apparent consensus on a development–security
nexus and the existing system for coordination. The SG also
established a Senior Management Group (SMT) to address manage-
ment issues and a Strategic Planning Unit to identify and review
crosscutting issues and trends.
Still, all these mechanisms, no matter how well they work, will
have little impact without the necessary leverage and authority. The
Secretary-General could and should utilise the powers entrusted to
him/her and enforce greater coordination through the mechanisms
available. A persistent obstacle is that the authority of the SG ends
where that of the agencies begins. However, the normative power
vested in the SG is underrated. If the SG would take a firmer stance,
many of the coordination bodies could be streamlined and followed
up more actively.
The basic aim of coordination is to reduce the duplication of
programmes and to harmonise the often-conflicting strategies of the
actors involved by defining common principles for action. Such
coordination may range from information sharing and informal
meetings to joint policy and strategy making and programme plan-
ning. An important first step is to move away from the turf culture
and the «agency approach» symptomatic of the UN Secretariat.
Instead of creating yet another mechanism without a comprehen-
sive review of the current bodies tasked to coordinate, one should
concentrate on why these do not work sufficiently well and identify
ways to consolidate, streamline and strengthen their authority.
In many ways the number of coordinating bodies and the cons-
tant pursuit of more transparency point up the seemingly contra-
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dictory nature of the UN. In practice, coordination has not come
easy, least of all among donors. This poses problems for accounta-
bility and, in the long term, impedes both learning and attempts to
identify best practices. A case in point is ECOSOC, which has no
power vested in it to make binding decisions. Hence, agencies, funds
and programmes within the UN family handling social and econo-
mic affairs are not obliged to implement decisions by ECOSOC.
On the other hand, the agencies, funds and programmes are gover-
ned by some of the very same UN Member States (Executive
Boards). Seen from a purely technical perspective the contradicti-
on is stark, but, given the inherently political nature of all UN acti-
vities, it further demonstrates the importance of recognising that
restructuring the Secretariat is only part of the solution.
As for the division of labour in maintaining peace and security,
the current structure is arguably not an effective way of addres-
sing increasingly complex challenges in the field. Institutional change
in the UN’s conflict-management structures has always been im-
provisational, lagging behind the realties of operations on the ground.
Both peacekeeping and its method of financing are products of inn-
ovation and an ad hoc approach. Despite almost six decades of
operations, peacekeeping is still being dealt with as something imper-
manent, with large parts of the peacekeeping budget dependent on
voluntary funding. Member States need to reflect on what role they
see for the UN. If the world organisation is to reinforce its credibi-
lity in maintaining peace and security, it will need to be enabled with
all means to face up to that challenge.
Another issue that has become more pressing with the increasingly
complex nature of UN engagement is the quality of personnel recruit-
ed, both at headquarters and in the field. Not only is there a need to
recruit people with appropriate backgrounds for the task at hand, in
particular with hands-on experience from local governance and admi-
nistration. It is also vital to provide appropriate training programmes that
can address cultural diversity. In a multicultural context, lack of under-
standing and articulation of the nature and influence of one’s culture
may be a serious stumbling block to building synergies.
Moreover, as «hybrid and integrated missions» authorised by the
Security Council increase the challenges to cooperation in the field,
this also calls for an in-depth scrutiny of issues of interoperability
between organisations and actors. Military, civilian police, political,
civilian and humanitarian actors alike, working in an increasingly
complex conflict environment, should be provided with comprehen-
sive joint pre-deployment training.
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In addition to quality and training, the importance of having
enough personnel cannot be stressed enough. Member States need
to recognise the importance of providing necessary support in terms
of financial and human resources. Several countries have establis-
hed rosters to meet the needs of the United Nations. In 1996, all
non-salaried personnel were banned in the UN system, making it
difficult to use existing Member States mechanisms for rapid deploy-
ment. Nonetheless, the demand for qualified personnel has conti-
nued to grow. It might be time to raise this issue again in the
appropriate UN fora.
4. Final Remarks
It is important not to opt for facile solutions, and to remain wary of
abstract institutional reform proposals as a panacea. The key to
understanding how to «reform» the UN lies less in trying to be
innovative and more in realising why past initiatives have failed and
how strategies and tactics could be improved. Member States have
tended to address the need for a multidimensional and coherent
approach by simply seeking to expand the mandate to include tasks
beyond what is realistically achievable. Designing «a strategically
informed mandate» requires consensus on all decision-making levels
on what the UN wants to achieve, well planned and locally attuned
sequencing of efforts, and will depend on whether the UN Member
States are «able, ready and willing to do it».
The UN can be no more than the sum of its Member States;
hence some may argue that this is ultimately a question of political
will and resources. The difficulty with most discussions of «politi-
cal will» is that more time is spent lamenting its absence than in
analysing what it means. Thinking about «political will» as a single,
simple factor in the equation underestimates the sheer complexity
of what is involved. Ultimately it is a question of priorities. Thus,
as the challenges become more complex, it is important not to yield
to the temptation of making the UN into a jack of all trades. If
multilateralism indeed is under siege, it is time for the Member Sta-
tes to define what architecture and role they do see for the UN –
particularly concerning the transition phase. Working in concert to
head off conflicts before they start, means recognising that an oun-
ce of conflict prevention is indeed worth a pound of peacekeeping
cure. Ultimately, where consensus exists, reform can be enacted;
where political will is lacking, it will founder.
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5. Recommendations
1. Create a comprehensive transition «roadmap». The preferred
modus operandi has been to rely on ad hoc approaches, with a
certain amount of built-in flexibility. However, lessons from the
past decade have highlighted the need for common overarching
principles. A systematic review of lessons learned and best
practices in transition management are necessary. Furthermore,
initiate a systemic review of the UN structure and hierarchy
of guidance, to clarify and agree on the mechanisms governing
the hierarchy of guidance of competencies that determine
decision-making processes. Existing guidelines, procedures,
and instructions should be synchronised; agree on common
terminology and level of authority; and ensure uniformity
in presentation. Such guidelines and procedures, must be made
available and accessible during induction training at all levels
and sections of the system.
2. Explore the wider role of cooperation between the UN and
regional organisations on transition management. More
attention should be given to strengthening the capacities of re-
gional organisations, especially in Africa, to perform such
transitional functions. In addition, the importance of streamlining
funding and projects in the field should be stressed, and efforts
to promote regional and sub-regional security and development
visions and objectives should be intensified. A UN backed
framework in support of inter-regional initiatives in the fields of
transition management should be created.
3. Conduct an analysis on the strategic cultures of the security
and development segments, of national and international
institutions responsible for planning and implementation and the
interplay between them. As many newly independent states have
inherited their ideas of government from the colonial
administrations, it would not be surprising if an administration
placed in a country by the international community would have
a similar effect. The meaning of a practice and timing of efforts
as understood in the local discourse may differ greatly from the
meanings attached to that practice in the international discourse.
4. Launch the idea of an in-depth analysis of the unintended
consequences of peacekeeping and peace-building activi-
ties in the field. Understanding the role of culture in
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peacekeeping is a necessary, yet not sufficient, component of
success. It is also important to identify ways of managing issues
of interoperability and organisational cultural differences, not
least in light of the expected increase in integrated and hybrid
missions. Gaining a firm grasp of the culture that underpins
substantive legitimacy also helps to create a frame of reference
for collective and individual actions on the ground and how these
are understood locally. Conflict alters traditional cultural patterns.
Restoring a society thus requires an understanding of these
patterns as a baseline. This must be reflected in the mission
planning and training given to all personnel prior to deployment.
In addition, it ought to be reflected by Members States, donors
and financial actors, by encouraging reviews of current criteria
and objectives for disbursement.
5. Establish a funding window for transition in the regular
budget of the United Nations; alternatively in the format of a
trust fund (Transitional Budget Line) based on cooperation
between the United Nations system, International Financial
Institutions and donor countries. To establish a trust fund the
UN could expand the terms of reference of the Fund for
Preventive Action to facilitate a broader spectrum of
interventions, including Quick Impact Projects and structural
prevention activities during transition periods.
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